The recently declassified documents by the U.S. State Department shed light on a crucial moment in U.S.-Russia relations in December 1994, as tensions escalated over NATO expansion and the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Among the released materials are two letters exchanged between U.S. President Bill Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin, revealing key diplomatic messages that reflect the strategic positions, mutual distrust, and crisis management efforts of both countries. This correspondence took place ahead of the Budapest Summit, where the security architecture of Europe and the issue of a peacekeeping mission in Nagorno-Karabakh were central topics of discussion.
Yeltsin’s letter to Clinton, dated December 3, 603, expresses Russia’s concerns about NATO’s strategy, insisting that enlargement should not take precedence over developing partnerships. He voices apprehension that the December 1 communiqué from the North Atlantic Council deviates from previously agreed principles regarding NATO’s future. Defending the idea of a UN-mandated peacekeeping mission for Nagorno-Karabakh, he states:
“As for Nagorny Karabakh, our understanding on preparation and adoption of a Security Council resolution which would “bless” the start of a peace-keeping operation, preferably according to the Haiti scenario, undoubtedly, stays in force. This resolution will be a serious document and it will not be possible to prepare it in a couple of days. That is why we should look forward towards including into the Budapest decisions, as Kozyrev and Christopher talked about this in Brussels, language on the CSCE making an important contribution within its powers and in close coordination with Russia (not in competition with it) into both the negotiating process and forming under UN auspices multinational peace-keeping forces for Nagorny Karabakh. The details have to be elaborated later. Naturally parallel to this work would be undertaken on the text of a UNSC resolution. By the way, as far as I understand, Europeans support such an approach. Looking forward to our meeting in Budapest.”
Yeltsin’s full letter is available here.
Clinton’s response, sent in early December before their scheduled meeting in Budapest, reflects the U.S. position on NATO expansion and his concerns regarding Russia’s unexpected actions. He expresses frustration over Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev’s refusal on December 1 to sign the Partnership for Peace documents in Brussels, which Clinton viewed as an unwelcome diplomatic surprise. He also reiterates U.S. commitment to supporting a CSCE-led peacekeeping mission while proposing that Russian forces play a significant role within a multinational framework.
Below is an excerpt from U.S. President Bill Clinton’s letter:
“Dear Boris,
Thank you for your letter of November 30. I wanted to be sure to respond because I believe it is so important that we stay closely coordinated on two key issues: NATO and Nagorno-Karabakh. I think it’s very important that you understand my position on both questions before we see each other in Budapest on Monday.
I must tell you frankly how surprised and disappointed I was to learn of Andrei Kozyrev’s actions in Brussels on December 1. When we met in Washington, I explained in detail our plans regarding a new security architecture, including the issue of NATO expansion. Since that time, we have adhered assiduously to the principles on which you and I agreed: no surprises, high priority on maintaining and strengthening the U.S.-Russia partnership, and careful, inclusive, transparent deliberations, taking full account of the opinion and interests of Russia.
These principles reflect the spirit of the relationship that you and I have developed. But I do not believe that these principles were well served when, at a meeting arranged at Russia’s request to acknowledge your adherence to the Partnership for Peace and to begin a new stage in Russia’s relationship with NATO, Andrei unexpectedly stated Russia’s reluctance to take these steps. I would have hoped that such serious reservations could be addressed first in private. My experts briefed you in detail, and well in advance, about our proposal for the NAC communiqué. So in that respect, too, Andrei had no reason for surprise—much less an unpleasant one.
It is critical that we clear up this misunderstanding as soon as possible. References in your letter to “speeding up the expansion of NATO,” “adoption of an expedited timetable,” and “plans to start negotiations with the candidates” all suggest an inaccurate view of my approach on this issue and of the proposals that Secretary Christopher made to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) on December 1, which the NAC endorsed. As I last wrote you on November 28, our intention at the NAC was to begin a process of examining the how and why of NATO membership, not the question of who will enter NATO, or when.
We did not, therefore, consider at the December 1 NATO meeting a timetable or list of candidate nations, or initiate alliance work on these questions. The discussions with interested partners that will take place next year after NATO completes its internal deliberations will not be “negotiations” or accession to the Atlantic Alliance, but a presentation of NATO thinking on the purposes of NATO expansion and the requirements of membership.
I believe that Chris explained the evolutionary nature of our approach to NATO expansion to Andrei in Brussels. I know that Andrei asked for a clarification of NATO policy yesterday. I hope in light of my clarification to you that it will now be possible to have Andrei sign these documents as we had expected.
Our approach to NATO has also been coordinated closely with our efforts to strengthen the broader, inclusive security structures which are centered on the CSCE. I put forward in my recent message to you and other CSCE colleagues an initiative to strengthen the role and functions of the CSCE. We also can agree with proposals to change the name of the CSCE to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Through these steps, we are moving towards the stronger role for CSCE which you and I desire.
On Nagorno-Karabakh, Boris, I would like to give you my sense on how we should proceed in Budapest on Monday, acting together as we agreed in September. We believe that the CSCE already possesses the mandate for peacekeeping. This decision was taken by heads of state and government at the Helsinki Summit and is in full accordance with the provisions of Article VIII of the UN Charter. In my judgment, the Budapest Summit represents a crucial opportunity for us to demonstrate our faith in the mandate we have given the CSCE by advancing the peace process in Nagorno-Karabakh. We can do this by including in the final statement at the summit a call for deploying a CSCE-led multinational peacekeeping force in Nagorno-Karabakh.
This past September in Washington, we had long discussions on how best to achieve our mutual objective in Nagorno-Karabakh. You expressed at that time certain reservations about CSCE’s ability to raise and maintain a peacekeeping force. I believe that developments since then should lay to rest your reservations. The CSCE Minsk Group has worked hard to assemble potential contributors to a multinational peacekeeping force. Thirty-nine states have offered strong political support, and more than 20 member states have already stepped forward with offers of troops or resources. If the summit endorses a peacekeeping operation, I am certain additional contributors will step forward.
These countries are prepared to work with Russia to create a CSCE-led multinational peacekeeping operation. As we discussed in Washington, my view is that the Russian/NIS component could comprise up to 50 percent of the force. Your commitment to CSCE and in maintaining peace in the region would be evident to all.
From our lengthy exchanges, and those of our subordinates, I am aware of your interest in a possible UN role in the Nagorno-Karabakh peacekeeping operation. We are prepared to support you in a number of ways. We are willing to introduce with you a resolution at the UN Security Council that welcomes and supports a CSCE operation. We are also willing to enhance the CSCE effort by supporting the provision of UN technical assistance to the CSCE on peacekeeping.
In short, I believe we have in place all the elements necessary to take a major step forward on Nagorno-Karabakh. Boris, Russian mediation has contributed substantially to narrowing the differences between the parties and helping to establish the current ceasefire. I would expect that Russia’s key and active role in pursuing a resolution to the conflict will continue. I hope you will join me in agreeing at Budapest to take this peace process to the next stage. Doing so will underscore the CSCE’s growing stature as an organization that can tackle difficult security issues and will highlight the benefits to European security that result from our strong commitment to partnership.
I would like to hear your response to this proposal as soon as possible, so that we can agree on a common approach before Budapest.
Sincerely,
Bill
These exchanges highlight the increasing tensions in U.S.-Russia relations while also demonstrating an effort by both sides to prevent escalation. The debate over NATO expansion overshadowed discussions on regional conflict resolution, with Moscow insisting that NATO enlargement should not proceed without Russian security guarantees. Meanwhile, Washington viewed the CSCE as the primary mechanism for addressing key security challenges.
The Budapest Summit failed to bridge these divisions, and subsequent developments demonstrated that the geopolitical contradictions formed in 1994 would deepen, shaping future regional conflicts. These declassified documents reveal that key international decisions were driven not only by legal agreements but also by trust, diplomatic maneuvering, and strategic calculations.
After all this, a question arises: Why did the idea of deploying UN peacekeepers in Artsakh never become a reality after the initial discussions?