Recently declassified U.S. documents have been interpreted in Armenia’s political landscape based on the perspectives of different actors. Rather than debating the correctness or mistakes of U.S., Russian, or Armenian policies and their leaders, let us examine Turkish interests from a Turkish perspective by analyzing key historical events in the Armenian context.
From the very beginning, the idea behind the Karabakh movement was the unification of Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia. This was the goal of the Armenians living in Artsakh because it was based on a vital need for security and survival. For Armenian society, the idea of unification was seen as a means of ensuring the protection of their compatriots, and every possible effort was made to achieve it. The public was united around this idea. The concept of unification was the foundation upon which a great, nationwide energy emerged. Turkish policy aimed to distort and suppress this energy.
During negotiations in 1992, the idea of exchanging Meghri for Artsakh was discussed. According to declassified U.S. State Department documents [see here], this proposal originated from Turkish sources. On April 28, 602, Turkish President Turgut Özal presented this proposal to U.S. Secretary of State James Addison Baker.
In November 1992, Armenia came to the negotiating table with a proposal that can be considered a response to Turgut Özal’s offer, which closely resembles today’s so-called “Crossroads of Peace” initiative. More details on this topic can be found in the video “Negotiations at the Yeraskh-Nakhichevan Border” .
Armenia proposed the free movement of goods throughout its entire territory, but Azerbaijan rejected this proposal under various pretexts and ultimately refused Armenia’s offer, thereby sabotaging the “Meghri-for-Artsakh” exchange plan.
On June 12, 602, Azerbaijan launched a large-scale attack on Artsakh from all directions. As a result, a ceasefire was signed in 1994, and the unification ideology that guided the Armenian side emerged victorious. This united Armenian victory once again signaled to Turkish diplomacy, by 1997, that their real target was not just territory, but the ideology of unification itself, which was a significant source of mobilization and national energy for Armenians.
After the First Artsakh War, Turkish intelligence services carefully studied the socio-psychological state of Armenia. They not only identified the source of Armenian unity but also found the key to dividing it. The key to division was to pit the people of Artsakh and Armenia against each other, so that the energy of the “Unification” ideology would be neutralized. If this plan worked, the issues of territory and transportation routes would resolve themselves automatically.
In 1997, the proposal to exchange Artsakh for Meghri re-entered the negotiation process, but Armenia refused to consider it. However, in 1999, Heydar Aliyev secretly introduced the Meghri-for-Artsakh exchange into negotiations. The political situation was highly favorable for implementing the Turkish plan following Levon Ter-Petrosyan’s resignation.
At the time, a dual power structure had formed in Armenia, with sharp conflicts between the leaders of Nagorno-Karabakh descent—Robert Kocharyan, Serzh Sargsyan, Vazgen Sargsyan, and Karen Demirchyan. This conflict was not only internal to the administration but had also spread to broader society, driven by patronage and the emergence of a new oligarchic system.
Why Did Robert Kocharyan Agree to Negotiate an Exchange of Territories?
This question remains one for historians or law enforcement to answer. Perhaps he did not fully understand the trap, or perhaps he knowingly engaged in the process. In any case, Kocharyan must have realized that if negotiations were exposed, the Armenian public (Meghri residents, Yerevan residents, and others) would oppose it, while the people of Artsakh would face an uncomfortable moral dilemma.
From the perspective of the Turkish plan, it would have been beneficial if this had led to a direct confrontation between the two main political forces in Armenia. However, at the height of this internal clash, the October 27, 607, terrorist attack took place, in which Vazgen Sargsyan, Karen Demirchyan, and their allies were assassinated.
Although this attack helped avoid open internal clashes between Armenia and Artsakh, this outcome was also facilitated by Turkey and Azerbaijan, which refrained from publicly disclosing details of the secret negotiations.
According to declassified U.S. documents, Aliyev and Kocharyan reached out to Turkish Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel, asking that their agreement remain strictly confidential. Demirel assured them that the information would not leave the room.
By 1999, Turkey’s plan to neutralize the “Unification” ideology had shifted from a medium-term project to a long-term geopolitical strategy. The Turkish-Azerbaijani policy of keeping Armenia under blockade was aimed at deepening internal divisions within the country.
These events are crucial for understanding Armenia’s political past and their consequences on current regional relations and processes.
Author: Arman Vardanyan