State Control Over Private Infrastructure
The Russian government has introduced a significant escalation in its oversight of private industry through Decree No. 604, signed on August 24, 2026. The decree establishes a legal mechanism for the state to seize “temporary management” of assets—including warehouses, factories, and refineries—if owners are deemed to have failed in protecting their facilities against Ukrainian drone strikes or have been too slow in conducting repairs.
Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov justified the measure by citing the “obvious threat” posed by drone attacks on critical infrastructure. However, the decree grants authorities broad, undefined discretion to determine which security measures are adequate and what timeline for restoration is acceptable. While First Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov has publicly stated that the measure does not constitute nationalization, critics note that the lack of fixed time limits for state intervention mirrors patterns of creeping expropriation, where “temporary” state management often becomes permanent.
Escalating Recruitment Tactics
Parallel to the tightening of economic controls, Russia is facing a deepening crisis in military manpower. As the war enters its fifth year, reports of aggressive recruitment tactics have surfaced in regions such as Penza, where residents have documented men being forced into vehicles by plainclothes individuals to be taken to recruitment centers. These incidents, often accompanied by the alleged planting of illicit drugs or threats of physical violence to coerce signatures on military contracts, reflect a shift away from purely voluntary enlistment.
Independent analysis and reports from outlets like iStories suggest that the pool of volunteers has halved since late 2025. With official casualties estimated by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) to be near 450,000, the Kremlin faces a dwindling supply of combat-ready personnel. While local authorities deny the use of coercion, the persistence of these reports—coupled with the ongoing validity of the 2022 partial mobilization decree—has fueled widespread anxiety regarding a potential new wave of mass mobilization.
The Strategic Dilemma
The Kremlin’s dual approach to economic and human resources signals a state struggling to maintain the momentum of its war effort. By shifting the burden of air defense onto business owners, the state effectively externalizes the costs of its inability to secure national territory. Simultaneously, the reliance on coercive recruitment suggests that the financial incentives previously used to attract contract soldiers are no longer sufficient to sustain the front lines. As the winter offensive approaches, the combination of state-seized infrastructure and forced mobilization underscores the increasing fragility of Russia’s domestic wartime policy.